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Abstract    
Restructuring of electricity supply industry had begun in early 20
th
 centuries. Malaysia 
Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) has aimed to change its structure to a wholesale market 
model in 2005. Started in 1992, Independent Power Producers (IPPs) were introduced and 
since then MESI had applied the Single Buyer Model until today. Even though, the Single 
Buyer Model had passed several process of evolution, it still a form of imperfect competition 
in which there is only one buyer and many sellers of a product. Therefore, other alternatives 
of electricity market model for MESI have been proposed, in order to carry on the MESI 
previous plan towards restructuring. This paper discusses three electricity market models; 
Single Buyer Market Model, Pool Market Model and Hybrid Market Model. The case study 
is carried out to compare the three market models in term of generation revenue. Data from 
14 IPP and load profiles in MESI is used for the case study and the result will be discussed.  
 
Introduction - The historical evolution of the Malaysian Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) 
leading to the formalization of the single buyer. Worldwide experience with the single buyer 
model has raised concern on how this model may backfire. Lack of transparency and fairness, 
poor system planning and non-competitive procurement are some of the drawbacks of a 
poorly constructed single buyer. Several observers citing conflict of interest, duplication of 
cost and tariff hikes. However, within Incentive-based regulation, single buyer is incentivized 
to be more efficient and transparent. These concerns can be mitigated as long as the single 
buyer remains regulated. MESI continues to face multi-dimensional challenges in term of 
tightness in fuel supply, industry governance and unsustainable tariff structure. The MESI 
reform transformation is clearly underway and more reform initiatives is expected to be 
implemented in the near future. 
 
Pool Market Model - The pool market model is one of the most preferred electricity market 
model implemented in many developing countries [1]. Focus on the pricing issue in pool 
market by extending the capacity payment mechanism in the single electricity market. The 
clustering capacity price approach in the capacity payment mechanism is to provide more 
significant generation revenue for generator. Below are the discrepancies for the pure pool 
market, single electricity market and pool clustering capacity price. 
 
Pure Pool Market - Pay the generator via the tool purchase price based on the SMP 
regardless the energy bid price [4]. 
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LOLP signifies the loss of load probability and VOLL is value of loss load. The revenue for a 
power producer i can be mathematically expressed as  
                                                        PPPGiPMi CPC                                                     (2) 
 
which 
GiP   signifies  power capacity available by ith generator to the pool in MW, PPC  is pool 
purchase price in RM/MWh, k  is numbers of generators involved and 
TG  is total generator 
income in RM/h. Total revenue for all power producers can be written as 
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All in-merit generators will be paid based on uniform price. 
 
Single Electricity Market (SEM) - SEM pay the generator via the Cpp based on the SMP 
regardless the energy bid price. The mathematical equations can be expressed as below which 
GiP   signifies the output power from the generator i and Cpp is the power purchase price. The 
capacity payment is calculated from the operating cost of the best new entrant (BNE) power 
plant [1]. Principally, the operating cost is depending on the type of generator, the location 
and fuel used to generate electricity. The lowest operating cost among the generators will be 
chosen as the capacity price [1]. 
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Pool Clustering Capacity Price - Pool Clustering introduces the capacity payment 
mechanism with clustering system for pool market. The pool clustering method placed 
generators into different cluster depend on generator types [1]. Each cluster has own capacity 
price. Capacity payment is paid off even though some of generator not generating during low 
demand. 
 
Single Buyer Model - There are two payment types in single buyer which are energy 
payment and capacity payment [2]. The energy payment in the PPA is a “pay as you use” 
payment meaning that the TNB will only pay for the amount of the energy it took from the 
IPP. The energy price is the key of the pattern dispatch. Ideally, only the cheaper generator or 
lowest running cost generator should be generating power to meet load demand. Therefore 
the mathematical equation which represents this type of payment for each IPP can be written 
as: 
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 which           signifies energy payment for each generator ,            is power output and  
 is energy price. 
The capacity payment is the amount of payment which TNB has to pay regardless 
whether the generated power is used or not [5]. The capacity payment is a mean for the IPP to 
recover a portion of its investment. The role for this payment is to provide extra revenue to 
the generator which are not generated thorough the charge of energy price. Therefore the 
mathematical equation which represents this type of payment for each IPP can be written as: 
                         GiGii CPG         (6) 
which            signifies capacity payment for each generator,           is available capacity and  
           is capacity price. Therefore, the mathematical equation for total revenue for power 
producers will be  
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Hybrid Market Model - A hybrid market model is to satisfy the generator revenue adequacy 
in Malaysian electricity market under a competitive environment [4]. In the hybrid market 
model, the load demand is divided into two parts; base load demand and peak load demand 
[3]. In the base load demand, the load is distributed to the generators based on the pro-rata 
basis. There is no competition among generators and the generators will share this load 
proportional to their available capacity, i.e. generators with higher available capacity will 
have high percentage share of the base load demand. The remaining high load demand will be 
traded through competition of the energy bid price offered by each generator. Generator with 
a lower energy bid price has the priority to supply the remaining demand. The generator’s 
payment for the base load demand would be based on the SMP while for the remaining load 
demand would be based their energy bid price. The MW level of base load demand will be 
determined from the daily load curve. The mathematical equation that represents each 
generator’s contribution to the base load demand can be written as; 
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which 
GiblP  signifies generator share of base load demand, GiP  signifies available capacity of a 
generator 
iG  and GTblP  is identified base load demand. 
 
Result and Discussion 
Figure 1 shows the total generation revenue in a day of 14 generators for weekday 
load profile. All 14 generators are able to supply electricity regardless their bid prices.  For 
pure pool market system, Gen 14 received zero revenue.  For SEM, all 14 generators have 
obtained the generation revenue due to chances of supplying electric power. Pool clustering 
capacity price and SEM assure a worth generation revenue for all generators. The pool 
clustering capacity price guarantees the welfare for all generators regardless the variation in 
electricity demand. The clustering system offers reasonable capacity payment for all types of 
generators. Although, expensive generators are incapable to compete during low load demand 
but with the capacity payment received might reduce the financial burden. 
 
 
Figure 1 : The total generators’ revenue in a day for weekday load profile  
Figure 2 shows that the total hourly revenue of 14 IPPs resulted from single buyer, 
pure pool and hybrid market model for weekday respectively. On a weekday, it can be seen 
that at low load demand, the generator revenue for both pool and hybrid market model are 
quite similar. At low load condition, the generators would gain more revenue under single 
buyer compare to other market as the generators still receive a fixed capacity payment. 
However, when the load demand is high, the generator revenues under pure pool market are 
much higher than the hybrid method. This is due to the increasing value of SMP, which 
produced higher pool purchasing price Cpp to be paid to the IPPs. When the hybrid market 
model is applied, the Cpp value is reduced because base demand is considered for every hour. 
It is shown that the hybrid market model has merit over the pure pool market in providing fair 
generator revenue over trading hours. During low demand, the pure pool market cannot 
guarantee hourly generator revenue for expensive generators. Some of IPPs might lose their 
revenue because of non-participation in the trading. With the hybrid market model, all IPPs 
have equal opportunities to participate in the trading and receive some revenue from their 
contribution in base load demand. Therefore, the efficiency of the power producer is always 
kept at the adequate level. 
 
Figure 2 : Total generation revenue at each hour for weekday load profile 
Conclusion 
The pool clustering introduces the capacity payment mechanism. Even though all 
generators could recover their operation and maintenance costs by bidding higher during peak 
load demand, having the capacity payment could smooth out energy price and help maintain 
the reserve margin. The pool clustering with clustering capacity price ensures the welfare of 
all generators in electricity supply industries. It is shown that the pool clustering provides 
adequate generation revenue to all generators compared to both pure pool and single 
electricity market. For that reason, all 14 generators and consumer are able to experience a 
more competitive environment with efficient electricity supply. Meanwhile, the hybrid 
market model can overcomes the weaknesses of the existing single buyer due to capacity 
payment and the pool market for guaranteed revenue remuneration of the generator. The base 
load demand sharing approach ensures the involvement of all IPPs in the hourly trading 
period. The hybrid market model is believed able to offer a fair competitive environment 
among power producers.  Finally, if either the pool clustering capacity payment or the hybrid 
market model can be executed by MESI, the generators will get reasonable profit, the 
distributor company will be able to pay appropriate amount and end-consumers will enjoy a 
low electricity tariff. 
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